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Abstract: This paper presents a novel surveillance system aimed at the detection and classification of1
threats in the vicinity of a long gas pipeline. The sensing system is based on phase-sensitive optical2
time domain reflectometry (φ-OTDR) technology for signal acquisition and pattern recognition3
strategies for threat identification. The proposal incorporates contextual information at feature level4
and applies a system combination strategy for pattern classification. The contextual information5
at feature level is based on the tandem approach (using feature representations produced by6
discriminatively trained multi-layer perceptrons) by employing feature vectors that spread different7
temporal contexts. The system combination strategy is based on a posterior combination of8
likelihoods computed from different pattern classification processes. The system operates in two9
different modes: (1) machine+activity identification, which recognizes the activity being carried out10
by a certain machine, and (2) threat detection, aimed at detecting threats no matter what the real11
activity being conducted is. In comparison with a previous system based on the same rigorous12
experimental setup, the results show that the system combination from the contextual feature13
information improves the results for each individual class in both operational modes, as well as14
the overall classification accuracy, with statistically significant improvements.15
Keywords: Distributed Acoustic Sensing; Fiber optic systems; φ-OTDR; Pipeline integrity threat16
monitoring; Feature-level contextual information; System combination17
1. Introduction18
Fiber optic distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) with phase-sensitive optical time-domain19
reflectometer (φ-OTDR) technology has been shown good performance for long perimeter20
monitorization aiming at detecting intruders on the ground [1–5], or vibration in general [6–14].21
Current pipeline integrity prevention systems combine DAS technology and pattern recognition22
systems (PRS) for continuous monitoring of potential threats to the pipeline integrity [15–22].23
In a previous work [22], we presented the first published report on a pipeline integrity threat24
detection and identification system that employs DAS+PRS technology, was evaluated on realistic25
field data, and whose results are based on a rigorous experimental setup and an objective evaluation26
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procedure with standard and clearly defined metrics1. In [22] we did a thorough revision of all27
the previous published works in this area, showing their main limitations related to the pattern28
classification design: Classification results were not presented, there was a lack of rigorous and29
realistic experimental conditions (database building, signal acquisition in limited distances), or were30
aimed at a small number of classes (see [22] for more details).31
More recently, new works on this topic have been published: In [19], there is again a lack of32
realistic experimental conditions since all the signals corresponding to the same event are recorded33
in the same fiber position (hence biasing the system to recognize the position instead of the real34
event), the sensed area covers up to 20 kilometers (which reduces its application in realistic fiber35
deployments), and only 5 classes are employed. In [21], the sensing area spreads 24 kilometers and36
the real experiments were conducted at a fixed distance of 13 kilometers away from the sensor (which37
we demonstrated in [22] that was a major issue when facing realistic environments), dealing with only38
3 classes. In addition, the number of tested signals in both works is small, with no additional details39
regarding the actual recording durations. Therefore, we can say that, again, these new systems do40
not fully address a realistic experimental setup that can assess the suitability of their proposals for41
realistic real time monitoring of long pipelines.42
The database used for the experiments in our previous work [22], which is composed of more43
than 1700 acoustic signals (about 10 hours of recordings), addresses all these issues: Different events44
were recorded and tested in different positions (covering different soil conditions) and different days45
(covering different environmental conditions) along a 40-kilometer pipeline. This, along with the46
adoption of a rigorous experimental procedure, allow us to state that the results are realistic enough47
to consider that similar performance can be obtained in field conditions.48
In what respect to the pattern recognition systems, one of the successful strategies used49
to improve their performance rates is adding contextual information [23]. For example, speech50
recognition systems obtain significant performance gains by incorporating context-dependent51
acoustic model information [24,25], or augmented features extracted from consecutive feature vectors52
(so-called first and second-order derivatives [26]). Image recognition systems also obtain significant53
improvements by incorporating contextual information within the final classification rule from54
multiple objects that appear in the image [27].55
In the field of fiber optic sensing, contextual information has also been employed for temperature56
measurement [28,29]. Our previous work [22] addressed the contextual information in a limited57
extent, since the Short-Time Fast Fourier Transform (ST-FFT) employed in the feature extraction58
spreads only 1 second2. Wavelets have also been employed previously to detect vibrations in59
distributed acoustic sensing systems, hence addressing contextual information to some extent as60
well [30]. Both approaches show a strategy based on adding sample-level contextual information,61
which means that the original signal is processed taking into account each sample context. However,62
the contextual information is usually applied within pattern classification systems at feature level [31–63
34], once the high dimensionality present in the input signal is reduced to a more discriminative set64
of features, which is more relevant for classification.65
Another successful strategy to improve the performance of pattern recognition systems relies66
on system combination. This is based on the fact that complementary errors are provided by67
different pattern classification processes. Combination based on sum, product, average, or maximum68
rules [35–37], majority voting [35,37], or more advanced techniques such as logistic regression [38],69
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [37], and neural networks [36,37,39] have been applied to pattern70
1 The original system was developed under a GERG (The European Gas Research Group) supported project titled PIT-STOP
(Early Detection of Pipeline Integrity Threats using a SmarT Fiber-OPtic Surveillance System).
2 This was the optimal window size, after an intensive experimentation with shorter and longer window sizes for the ST-FFT,
all of them leading to lower system performance.
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recognition systems in different fields such as image recognition, speaker verification, handwritten71
recognition, and speech recognition, showing significant performance gains.72
1.1. Motivation and Organization of the Paper73
The pipeline integrity threat detection and identification system presented in previous74
works [15–22,40,41] did not make use of feature-level contextual information, nor exploited the75
possibility of combining results from different pattern recognition systems. Given the potential of76
both strategies, we propose to apply them on DAS+PRS technology for pipeline integrity threat77
detection and identification from two different perspectives:78
• Incorporating feature-level contextual information in an intelligent way, adapting the so-called79
tandem approach widely used in speech recognition [42] to enhance the feature vector of the80
baseline system.81
• Combining the outputs of different pattern classification processes, each of them using a82
combination of frequency-based and tandem features, exploiting different temporal ranges of83
contextual information.84
In this paper, we present (to the best of our knowledge) the first published report that85
incorporates contextual information at feature level and system combination in a DAS+PRS-based86
pipeline integrity threat detection and identification system, and is rigorously evaluated on realistic87
field data, showing significant and consistent improvements over our previous work [22].88
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The baseline system is briefly reviewed in Section 2,89
and Section 3 describes the novel pipeline integrity threat detection system. The experimental90
procedure is presented in Section 4 and the experimental results are discussed in Section 5. Finally,91
the conclusions are drawn in Section 6 along with some lines for future work.92
Figure 1. Baseline version of the system architecture [22].
2. Baseline System93
2.1. Sensing System94
The DAS system we used is a commercially available φ-OTDR-based sensor (named FINDAS)95
manufactured and distributed by FOCUS S.L. [43].96
For interested readers, a full theoretical revision of the sensing principle, and a detailed97
description of the experimental setup used in the FINDAS sensor can be found in [44], but we provide98
here a short summary of the sensing strategy used. The φ-OTDR makes use of Rayleigh scattering99
— an elastic scattering (with no frequency shift) of light which originates from density fluctuations100
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in the medium — to measure changes in the state of a fiber. In the FINDAS sensor employed, highly101
coherent optical pulses with a central wavelength near 1550 nm are injected into the optical fiber. The102
back-reflected signal from the fiber is then recorded, so that the interference pattern resultant from103
Rayleigh backscattering (φ-OTDR signal) is monitored at the same fiber input. By mapping the flight104
time of the light in the fiber, the φ-OTDR signal received at a certain time is associated with a fiber105
position. If vibrations occur at a certain position of the fiber, the relative positions of the Rayleigh106
scattering centers will be altered, and the φ-OTDR signal will be locally changed, thus allowing for107
distributed acoustic sensing [44].108
The FINDAS has an (optical) spatial resolution of 5 meters (readout resolution of 1 meter) and109
a typical sensing range of up to 45 kilometers, using standard Single-Mode Fiber (SMF). A sampling110
frequency of fs = 1085 Hz was used for signal acquisition. A detailed description of the FINDAS111
technology can be found in [44].112
2.2. Pattern Recognition System113
The baseline PRS was based on Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs), and conducted classification114
in two different modes:115
1. The machine+activity identification mode identifies the machine and the activity that the machine116
is conducting along the pipeline.117
2. The threat detection mode directly identifies if the activity is an actual threat for the pipeline or118
not.119
The whole system integrated three main stages, as shown in Fig. 1:120
• Feature extraction, which reduces the high-dimensionality of the signals acquired with the DAS121
system to a more informative and discriminative set of features.122
• Feature vector normalization, which compensates for variabilities in the signal acquisition process123
and the sensed locations.124
• Pattern classification, which classifies the acoustic signal into a set of predefined NC classes (using125
a set of signal models, GMMs, previously trained from a labeled signal database).126
This system obtained promising results taking into account the ambitious experimental setup127
(i.e., recordings in a real industrial deployment). However, the absolute performance rate in128
machine+activity classification (45.15%, far better than the 12.5% chance rate for NC = 8 classes)129
is not still high enough for a practical system in field operations. Even though the threat/non-threat130
classification rates were much better (80% of threat detection and 40% of false alarms), strategies to131
improve both rates are necessary.132
The initial performance target that the GERG partners fixed to consider the system deployment133
in field was over 80% for the threat detection rate, and below 50% for the false alarm rate, so that these134
targets are actually achieved by the current proposal. In what respect to the performance target for the135
machine+activity identification rates, the GERG partners did not impose any specific requirements,136
as the crucial aspect for real world deployment is accurate threat-detection. Considering the difficulty137
of the task (with 8 different classes), identification rates in the range of 70%− 80% are reasonable to138
start with.139
3. Novel Pipeline Integrity Threat Detection System140
The proposal of the novel pipeline integrity threat detection system is presented in Fig. 2. First,141
the input acoustic signal is sent to a feature extraction module, where the energy corresponding to142
P frequency bands is calculated for the considered bandwidth f ∈ [ f0, fBW ], with f0 and fBW being143
the initial and final frequencies respectively, and fBW ≤ fs2 . This builds NP-dimensional feature144
vectors (NP = 100). The feature normalization employed in this work is the sensitivity-based145
normalization described in Section III.B.2 of [22], where each coefficient of those feature vectors is146
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Figure 2. Novel pipeline integrity threat detection system architecture. Modules in bold typeface are
the new ones with respect to [22].
normalized by the energy above the considered bandwidth. This was necessary due to the strong147
differences in the signals acquired in different sensing positions, which relate to the different soil148
conditions, the mechanical coupling of the fiber to the pipe enclosure, the machinery distance, the149
non-linear transduction function of a φ-OTDR-based sensor, the exponential decay of the amplitude150
of the measured signals along the fiber, etc. (see [22] for more details). The pattern classification151
module employs a GMM-based approach to classify each feature vector into the most likely class152
(machine+activity pair in the machine+activity identification mode that deals with NC = 8 classes, and153
threat/non-threat in the threat detection mode that deals with NC = 2 classes). This employs the a154
posteriori maximum probability criterion to assign the given feature vector the class with the highest155
probability given by the corresponding GMM. The additional blocks, the contextual feature extraction156
(that also needs a new previous training stage) and the decision combination are new with respect to our157
previous work [22], and are explained in more detail next.158
3.1. Contextual Feature Extraction159
The contextual feature extraction is based on the tandem approach used to compute the160
so-called tandem features in speech recognition tasks [45–47]. This module takes the normalized161
frequency-based feature vectors as input and produces tandem feature vectors as output.162
A multi-layer perceptron (MLP) is employed to integrate the feature-level contextual163
information. This MLP has three layers, as shown in Fig. 3: An input layer that consists of NP ·Wsize164
feature vector values, where Wsize is the number of feature vectors used as contextual information165
(for an acoustic frame being analyzed at time t, the MLP will use the Wsize/2 feature vectors before t166
and the Wsize/2 feature vectors after t, along with the feature vector generated for time t), a hidden167
layer, whose number of units is selected based on preliminary experiments, and an output layer,168
with the number of units equals to the number of classes involved in the system modes (8 in the169
machine+activity identification mode and 2 in the threat detection mode).170
Specifically, three MLPs will be used to model the behavior of short, medium, and long171
temporal contexts, using Wshort, Wmedium, and Wlong feature temporal window sizes, respectively.172
The objective is effectively dealing with different signal behaviors that cope with short, medium,173
and long temporal contexts, so that a wider range of activities can be better learned by the system.174
In our implementation, the time lengths of each temporal context are 5 seconds, 12.5 seconds, and 20175
seconds, corresponding to the short, medium, and long temporal contexts, respectively. These lengths176
were chosen based on the length of a single behavior within different activities. For example, for177
stable activities such as moving, long temporal windows are more suitable to model a single behavior.178
However, for more difficult activities (hitting or scrapping that include several behaviors), shorter179
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Figure 3. Architecture of the 3-layer MLP employed in the contextual feature extraction module.
temporal windows are preferable so that the temporal windows used for modeling better cope with180
generating a robust model for a single behavior.181
Fig. 4 shows the detailed architecture of the contextual feature extraction module and its182
connection to the GMM-based pattern classification modules.183
The MLP models required for each temporal context (referred to as MLPS, MLPM, and MLPL in184
Fig. 4) are trained by the MLP training module in Fig. 2. The standard back-propagation algorithm [48]185
is employed to learn the MLP weights (i.e., connections between all the units of the input and hidden186
layers and connections between all the units of the hidden and output layers, as shown in Fig. 3).187
Therefore, three different sets of weights are learn (one for each temporal context), which are used188
next to obtain the posterior probability vectors.189
The contextual feature extraction involves two different stages, which are applied to each of the190
different temporal contexts:191
3.1.1. Posterior probability vector computation192
For each set of normalized feature vectors, and using the weights computed during MLP193
training, the MLP is employed to calculate a posterior probability for each class to be identified. This194
process is similar to use the MLP for classification. However, instead of assigning a raw class label to195
each normalized feature vector, the MLP outputs (consisting of one posterior probability per class, as196
shown in Fig. 3) are used as new features. This builds a set of NC-dimensional posterior probability197
vectors per MLP (i.e., per temporal context), as shown in Fig. 4.198
3.1.2. Tandem feature vector building199
This stage concatenates the original NP-dimensional feature vectors (those generated by the200
feature normalization module), and the NC-dimensional posterior probability vectors computed201
by the MLPs. Therefore, (NP + NC)-dimensional tandem feature vectors are built (in our202
implementation, NP + NC = 108 for the machine+activity identification mode, and NP + NC = 102203
for the threat detection mode). These are fed into three different pattern classification processes (one204
for each temporal context), which generate a likelihood value for each of the NC classes, as shown in205
Fig. 4. It must be noted that the GMM training is also carried out from these tandem feature vectors.206
For MLP training, posterior probability vector computation, and tandem feature vector building,207
the ICSI QuickNet toolkit [49] has been employed.208
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Figure 4. Detailed architecture of the contextual feature extraction module and its connection to the
GMM-based pattern classification modules.
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3.2. Decision Combination209
Given the three pattern classification processes conducted on the tandem feature vectors that210
cover different temporal contexts, and in order to exploit their complementarity when dealing with211
different activities, a way to combine their outputs is necessary. In this work, we have evaluated212
three methods to carry out a likelihood-based combination: Sum, Product, and Maximum, which are213
presented next:214
3.2.1. Sum method215






where N is the number of classification processes, and lj(ci) is the likelihood assigned to class ci in217
the classification process j.218
This sum method is typically better adapted for cases in which each classifier performs219
different [50].220
3.2.2. Product method221






This product method is typically better adapted for systems where the feature sets are223
independent [51].224
3.2.3. Maximum method225






This maximum method is typically better adapted for systems where the performance of each227
individual classifier is similar [50].228
For all the combination methods, the class that is finally assigned to each frame as the recognized229




The combination approach can be applied to all the classification processes, or to a selection of231
them, so that a fruitful experimentation can be carried out.232
4. Experimental Procedure233
Our experimental setup is basically the same than that described in Section IV of [22]. We provide234
here the fundamental details, referring the reader to the original paper for further details.235
4.1. Database Description236
For comparison purposes, we employed the same database as in our previous work [22], whose237
content is summarized in Table 1.238
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As described in [22], an active gas transmission pipeline operated by Fluxys Belgium S.A. was239
used for the database acquisition, thus operating in a real scenario. The pipeline is made from240
steel, has a diameter of 1 meter, and is 1 inch thick. Activities nearby the pipeline were sensed by241
monitoring an optical fiber cable installed about 0.5 meters from the pipeline and parallel to it (the242
fiber cable installation was done at the same time of the pipeline construction). The pipeline and243
the associated optical fiber are buried, and the pipeline is pressurized at 100 bars (being an active244
one, operating in normal conditions). The fiber depth varies between 0.3 and 2 meters, and since it245
does not follow a tight parallel path along the pipeline, and in some points there are fiber rolls for246
maintenance purposes, a calibration procedure between fiber distance and geographical location was247
carried out for precise location labeling.248
The selected activities cover realistic situations (involving possible threats and harmless ones)249
that could typically occur nearby pipeline locations. All of them were carefully selected by the250
GERG partners within the PIT-STOP project, and represented those activities that could provide251
the best assessment of the system capabilities for real world deployment. In particular, the staff at252
Fluxys Belgium S.A. (the gas carrier company in this country) was responsible for the proposal of the253
activities to be carried out for evaluation.254
On the one hand, the dangerous activities (hitting and scrapping by small and big excavators),255
allowed the system to be tested when a real threat for the pipeline occurs (as it is the usual situation256
before a critical pipeline “touch” happens).257
On the other hand, the non-threat activities were chosen based on their high-occurrence rate near258
pipelines (movements of different machinery, and non-dangerous activities performed by pneumatic259
hammer and plate compactor machines).260
The FINDAS sensor is connected at one end of the fiber that runs in parallel to the inspected261
pipeline. The different locations (LOC1, LOC2, LOC3, LOC4, LOC5, and LOC6) cover different262
pipeline “reference positions” selected at high distances from the sensing equipment (being at 22.24,263
22.49, 23.75, 27.43, 27.53, and 34.27 kilometers far from the FINDAS box respectively) to evaluate the264
system in conditions close to the actual sensing limits and to ensure feature variabilities in terms of265
soil characteristics and weather conditions (see [22] for more details).266
The machines used for the recordings of the different machine+activity pairs started their activity267
at the center of the so-called “Machine operation area” (see Fig. 5 for a visual reference). This268
area was located at distances between 0 meters (on top of the fiber), and up to 50 meters from the269
so-called “Reference position” right above the pipeline3. The “hitting” and “scrapping” activities270
were recorded five times in different positions within the machine operation area (the first position271
was located in the center of the area, and the other four were located at ±25 meters and ±50 meters272
from this center, with direction depending on the available space around the operation area). The273
“movement” and “compacting” activities spread around ±25 meters from the center of the operation274
area. These two activities were recorded in two different ways: the first one comprises both movement275
and compacting actions when the machine is carrying out the activity parallel to the pipeline, being276
the second one with the activity carried out perpendicular to the pipeline. This allowed us to generate277
different acoustic patterns corresponding to both ways, hence obtaining a more varied database.278
From this “Reference position”, the signals were captured from the optical fiber in a ±200 meter279
interval (see Fig. 5), with 1 meter spacing, thus generating 400 acoustic traces for each recorded280
activity. This 400-meter interval was selected to ensure that we had a wide enough range of fiber281
responses to be used in the training and evaluation procedures.282
Although the distance of the acoustic source (the machine performing the given activity) to the283
optical fiber has an impact on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the high sensitivity of the sensing system284
3 As described in [22] in the recording protocol for each location, the reference position was chosen manually as the closest
to the center of the operation area with good sensitivity, by real time monitoring of the fiber response.
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Table 1. Experimental database. ‘Big excavator’ is a 5 ton Kubota KX161-3. ‘Small excavator’ is a 1.5
ton Kubota KX41-3V. From [22].
Machine Activity Duration (in seconds) ThreatNon-threatLOC1 LOC2 LOC3 LOC4 LOC5 LOC6 Total
Big
excavator
Moving along the ground 1100 1100 3540 1740 1620 4160 13260 Non-threat
Hitting the ground 120 140 240 220 80 260 1060 Threat
Scrapping the ground 460 460 920 620 200 580 3240 Threat
Small
excavator
Moving along the ground 600 500 1700 820 820 1660 6100 Non-threat
Hitting the ground 200 180 220 220 80 240 1140 Threat
Scrapping the ground 420 340 780 360 180 520 2600 Threat
Pneumatic
hammer Compacting ground 660 0 580 1320 0 1320 3880 Non-threat
Plate
compactor Compacting ground 740 0 740 1240 0 1680 4400 Non-threat
within the limits of the selected “Machine operation area” for each location makes the SNR to be good285
enough to cover realistic and practical situations. Moreover, the trained signal models are also able286
to cope with this variability due to the acoustic source distance to the pipeline.287
4.2. System Configuration288
Regarding the feature extraction, the relevant parameters are as follows: The acoustic frame size289
was set to 1 second, the acoustic frame shift was set to 5 milliseconds, the number of FFT points was290
set to 8192, the number of frequency bands (i.e., the original feature vector size) was set to 100, and291
the initial and final frequencies corresponding to the analyzed bandwidth were set to 1 Hz and 100292
Hz respectively.293
The highest energy meter selection in our previous work has been selected for signal294
representation, due to its better performance over the reference position (see Fig. 5) [22]. Therefore,295
each acoustic frame used either for training or evaluation (MLP in the contextual feature extraction296














 RP at this side 
Recorded fiber segment 
Fiber
Pipeline
Figure 5. Recording scenario: Real example at LOC6, taken from [22].
For the contextual feature extraction, 100 units have been used in the hidden layer for MLP299
training and posterior probability vector computation for the machine+activity identification mode,300
and 3 units for the threat detection mode. These values were chosen based on their best performance301
in preliminary experiments.302
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For pattern classification, a single GMM component has been used to model each class in both303
modes.304
The use of the sensitivity-based normalization and the bandwidth limited to 100 Hz is explicitly305
designed to also help in dealing with the noise in the raw data. The normalization aids in equalizing306
noise effects compensating for variabilities in the signal acquisition process and the sensed location307
(as background noise can vary for different locations due to the proximity of road, factories, etc.),308
and the bandwidth limitation avoids considering noisy signals where no relevant information is to309
be found. Also, while variations in the fiber temperature could introduce noise in the measurements,310
these typically occur at much lower frequencies than the processed acoustic signals so that they do311
not constitute a relevant issue in our proposal. Nevertheless, even though the raw signals have312
a high level of noise (as shown in the sample signal spectrograms shown in Fig. 2 of [22]), each313
machine+activity pair exhibits, in general, a reasonably consistent spectral behavior, hence allowing314
for the use of pattern classification strategies that can efficiently extract this consistent behavior. A315
full experimental and theoretical description of the optical noise characteristic of the DAS technology316
using a similar setup, which defines the background noise of the raw data, can be found in [44].317
4.3. Evaluation Strategy318
The evaluation strategy was carefully and rigorously designed to maximize the statistical319
significance of the results and to provide a wide variety in the design of the training and evaluation320
subsets.321
With this objective, the robust and widely adopted leave-one-out cross-validation (CV)322
strategy [52] was selected to carry out the experiments. The criteria to split the full database in323
training and evaluation subsets match with the recorded data location criteria. Since data were324
recorded in 6 different locations, the CV strategy comprises 6 folds, where the data recorded in all the325
locations except one were used for training (including MLP training and posterior probability vector326
computation for the contextual feature extraction and GMM training for the pattern classification),327
and the evaluation was done on data of the unused location (thus ensuring full independence328
between the training and evaluation subsets). Classification is again conducted on a frame-by-frame329
basis.330
Using the data from the same locations for MLP training and posterior probability vector331
computation in the contextual feature extraction could lead to overfitting problems, since a subset332
of the data employed for MLP training is also used to compute the posterior probability values of333
the tandem feature vectors employed for training the pattern classification module. To evaluate334
this drawback, we ran a full set of experiments in which different locations for MLP training and335
posterior probability vector computation were employed, and similar results are obtained, which336
clearly indicates that no overfitting occurs.337
4.4. Evaluation Metrics338
As in our previous work [22], and for comparison purposes, the classification accuracy has been339
the main metric to evaluate the system performance both for the machine+activity identification340
and threat detection modes. In addition, we will also show the class classification accuracy for the341
machine+activity identification mode, and the threat detection rate and false alarm rate for the threat342
detection mode. Finally, to provide a full picture of the classification performance we will also show343
the confusion matrix (i.e., a table that shows the percentage of evaluation frames of a given class that344
are classified as any of the considered classes) for the machine+activity identification mode. Statistical345
validation of the results will be provided to assess the statistical significance of the results.346
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Table 2. MLP classification accuracy for the machine+activity identification mode for every class with
various window sizes with the best result for each class in bold font. ‘Acc.’ is the overall classification
accuracy, with the best result in bold font. ‘Mov.’ stands for moving, ‘Hit.’ stands for hitting, ‘Scrap.’
stands for scrapping, and ‘Compact.’ stands for compacting.
Machine+activity identification






Window size Mov. Hit. Scrap. Mov. Hit. Scrap. Compact. Compact.
Baseline [22] 49.1% 20.1% 26.0% 50.5% 13.8% 30.2% 71.8% 39.5% 45.2%
Short 63.3% 13.0% 31.5% 54.8% 10.7% 26.5% 73.9% 57.3% 53.5%
Medium 72.9% 12.1% 35.4% 63.8% 8.8% 28.3% 76.9% 51.3% 58.6%
Long 82.5% 12.3% 34.5% 62.5% 7.0% 28.1% 82.2% 46.2% 61.8%
5. Experimental Results347
5.1. Preliminary Experiments348
A preliminary set of experiments was run to show the potential effectiveness of (1) using349
contextual information, and (2) combining different contextual information sources in the whole350
system.351
This set of experiments takes the 100-dimensional normalized feature vectors as input for the352
MLP and conducts classification. For MLP-based classification, we simply assign the class with353
the highest posterior probability as the recognized class with which we can evaluate the system354
performance. The different temporal contexts (short, medium, and long) are employed for MLP355
training and classification, and the obtained results are presented in Table 2.356
From Table 2, it is clearly seen that, even though the overall accuracy improves when increasing357
the temporal context, the optimal temporal context (short, medium, or long) is different for each358
machine+activity pair (best rates are shown in bold). For example, for the big excavator moving,359
the baseline performance is 49.1%, and this increases to 63.3%, 72.9%, and 82.5% when using360
progressively longer temporal contexts (short, medium, and long, respectively). On the other hand,361
for the small excavator hitting, increasing the temporal context leads to systematic performance362
degradation from the 13.8% obtained in the baseline to 10.7%, 8.8%, and 7.0% for progressively longer363
temporal contexts.364
These results indicate that different temporal contexts model the feature space in a different way,365
so that employing and combining different window sizes could bring further improvements to the366
whole system performance (thus motivating our combination approach). In addition, the MLP does367
not seem to be suitable to replace the GMM for classification. Despite the best overall performance368
obtained with the long-length window size, there are some classes whose performance is worse than369
that of the baseline (hitting and scrapping activities with the small excavator, and hitting activity370
with the big excavator, which include multiple behaviors and have the less amount of training data).371
Therefore, this motivates the use of the MLP to produce a tandem feature vector and to maintain the372
GMM-based pattern classification system.373
5.2. Contextual Feature Extraction374
We analyze the performance of the contextual feature extraction module from the tandem feature375
vectors that are built from different window sizes. To do so, a GMM-based pattern classification376
process is carried out for each of the proposed temporal contexts (short, medium, and long), as shown377
in Fig. 4, and results are presented in Table 3.378
At first sight, for the machine+activity identification mode, the average system performance379
compared with the baseline (column Acc. in Table 3) seems to improve to a great extent (57.8% −380
45.2% = 12.6% absolute improvement). Paired t-tests [53] show that this improvement is statistically381
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Table 3. Contextual feature extraction module results. Class classification accuracy and overall
classification accuracy for the machine+activity identification mode, and threat detection rate (TDR),
false alarm rate (FAR), and overall classification accuracy for the threat detection mode, with the best
results in bold font. ‘Acc.’, ‘Mov.’, ‘Hit.’, ‘Scrap.’, and ‘Compact.’ denote the same as in Table 2.
Machine+activity identification Threat detection





Acc. TDR FAR Acc.
Window size Mov. Hit. Scrap. Mov. Hit. Scrap. Compact. Compact.
Baseline [22] 49.1% 20.1% 26.0% 50.5% 13.8% 30.2% 71.8% 39.5% 45.2% 80.7% 40.3% 64.3%
Short 60.6% 17.0% 32.0% 55.9% 11.6% 27.8% 75.6% 54.0% 52.8% 78.9% 36.3% 67.1%
Medium 66.1% 19.0% 36.9% 62.0% 10.8% 30.3% 75.9% 49.7% 56.0% 76.6% 32.3% 69.7%
Long 74.4% 21.5% 30.2% 59.2% 13.4% 28.5% 81.1% 43.4% 57.8% 71.6% 31.2% 69.4%
significant for any window size over the baseline (p < 10−32). However, looking at the individual382
class performance, this improvement is not that clear. There are classes for which very similar or even383
slightly worse performance is obtained with the tandem feature vectors (e.g., small excavator doing384
hitting (13.8% for the baseline system and 13.4% for the tandem system) and scrapping (30.2% for the385
baseline system and 30.3% for the tandem system)), and the best performance for each class largely386
depends on the window size.387
The large improvement obtained with the tandem feature vectors is for the classes for which388
more data are available. For example, the moving activity from the big excavator improves the389
49.1% baseline performance to 74.4% for the tandem system, and from the small excavator the390
improvement goes from the 50.5% baseline performance to 62.0%. Also, large improvements are391
observed for the plate compactor (from 39.5% to 54.0%) and the pneumatic hammer (from 71.8% to392
81.1%). The fact that more data are available for these classes is biasing the performance calculation,393
but we also have to consider the effect on the classes with lower performance. The high performance394
classes, which tend to have a more stable behavior, get much more benefit from the feature-level395
contextual information than classes that represent different acoustic behaviors (i.e., hitting and396
scrapping activities). The greater amount of training data of those classes also contributes to this,397
since a more robust GMM is trained.398
On the contrary, for classes with different acoustic behaviors during its execution (hitting and399
scrapping), integrating these multiple behaviors could lead to less robust GMMs, so that the final400
performance for these classes is similar or even worse than that of the baseline. For example, for401
the small excavator hitting, there is a performance degradation from the baseline 13.8% to 13.4%.402
The only exception for this observation is the improvement obtained for the big excavator doing403
scrapping (36.9% versus 26.0% of the baseline), which may be due to the greater amount of training404
data available, so that a more robust GMM is built.405
This suggests that using feature-level contextual information in isolation is not enough to obtain406
the best performance in the whole system for classes for which different acoustic behaviors are407
observed and the amount of data used to train the GMM is limited.408
For the threat detection mode, it can be seen that incorporating feature-level contextual409
information also provides an improvement in the overall classification accuracy over the baseline410
(69.7% − 64.3% = 5.4% absolute improvement). Paired t-tests show that this improvement is411
statistically significant for any window size (p < 10−24) over the baseline. However, by inspecting412
the threat detection rate and the false alarm rate, it can be seen that both figures decrease compared413
with those of the baseline, which makes more difficult derive a clear conclusion.414
From these results, we can state that decision combination is necessary to take advantage of the415
complementary classification errors obtained for each temporal context.416
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Table 4. Decision combination results. Class classification accuracy and overall classification accuracy
for the machine+activity identification mode, and threat detection rate (TDR), false alarm rate (FAR),
and overall classification accuracy for the threat detection mode with the best results in bold font.
For combination, ‘Prod’ is the Product method and ‘Max’ is the Maximum method. ‘S’ denotes short
window size, ‘M’ denotes medium window size, and ‘L’ denotes long window size. ‘Acc.’, ‘Mov.’,
‘Hit.’, ‘Scrap.’, and ‘Compact.’ denote the same as in Table 2.
Machine+activity identification Threat detection





Acc. TDR FAR Acc.
Method Mov. Hit. Scrap. Mov. Hit. Scrap. Compact. Compact.
Baseline [22] 49.1% 20.1% 26.0% 50.5% 13.8% 30.2% 71.8% 39.5% 45.15% 80.7% 40.3% 64.26%
Prod
S-M 59.9% 19.4% 36.3% 60.4% 13.0% 33.8% 75.8% 44.4% 53.06% 76.8% 33.2% 69.10%
S-L 64.3% 23.7% 32.1% 57.7% 18.0% 31.1% 80.4% 40.1% 53.91% 74.9% 33.7% 68.25%
M-L 66.1% 22.2% 33.7% 57.9% 14.3% 36.6% 78.4% 41.3% 54.92% 73.9% 32.0% 69.32%
S-M-L 61.5% 24.0% 34.0% 57.6% 15.0% 36.9% 78.2% 39.8% 53.09% 75.0% 33.2% 68.68%
Max
S-M 67.3% 17.3% 36.9% 64.2% 9.7% 27.2% 79.5% 56.6% 57.75% 81.0% 36.2% 67.66%
S-L 76.8% 17.2% 32.1% 62.9% 10.9% 29.4% 81.1% 50.0% 60.20% 79.7% 35.0% 68.29%
M-L 76.6% 14.8% 34.2% 64.1% 11.5% 29.2% 80.1% 49.9% 60.33% 78.4% 33.4% 69.24%
S-M-L 77.0% 14.5% 34.0% 65.0% 10.0% 27.8% 81.7% 51.4% 60.82% 81.1% 35.4% 68.34%
5.3. Decision Combination417
Decision combination employs different combinations of temporal contexts (in pairs, or all of418
them) to make the final decision for each frame. Results are shown in Table 4 for the machine+activity419
identification mode and the threat detection mode. To ease the analysis, the results for the Sum420
method are not shown as they are almost identical to those obtained with the Product method.421
Additionally, the cells with worse results than the baseline have an orange background, and the green422
background cells indicate the selected systems for the machine+activity identification and threat423
detection modes. As it can be seen, almost all the results obtained with the decision combination424
improve those of the baseline.425
5.3.1. Machine+activity identification mode426
For the machine+activity identification mode, the combination of any window size with any427
combination method outperforms the overall classification accuracy of the baseline in a great428
extent (52.91% − 45.15% = 7.76% minimum absolute improvement, which means a 17% relative429
improvement). Paired t-tests show that this improvement is statistically significant for all the cases430
(p < 10−30).431
For Sum and Product methods, consistent performance gains are obtained for all the classes432
in general. Sum method is expected to work well when each individual classifier performs quite433
different [50], as is our case (see Table 3). Product method is also expected to derive a robust434
combination when the feature sets are independent [51]. Different temporal contexts model the435
feature space in a different way so that the feature set for every class can be considered as436
independent.437
For hitting and scrapping activities, which possess multiple behaviors and have the less amount438
of training data, the performance obtained with the Maximum method is much worse than that of the439
baseline (for example, for the small excavator hitting, the 13.8% baseline gets as low as 9.7%). This440
can be due to two reasons: (1) The Maximum method does not integrate information of different441
classification processes (only the best likelihood is selected), which for multi-class classification442
problems is important, and (2) this method provides gains when the performance of the individual443
classifiers is close, which is not our case (see Table 3). The only exception is again for the big excavator444
doing scrapping, for which performance gains are obtained for each combination method (from the445
26.0% baseline performance up to 36.3% with the Product Method and 36.9% with the Maximum446
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Table 5. Confusion matrix of the Product combination method from medium and long window sizes
for the machine+activity identification mode. Classification Accuracy is shown in each cell. The
values between brackets represent the number of frames that are classified as the recognized class, or
that belong to the real class.
Recognized class



























[21995] Hitting 30.60 22.15 19.21
[67230] Scrapping 24.64 33.74 18.39
Small
excavator
[126575] Moving 57.91 16.92
[23655] Hitting 17.03 14.01 14.32 29.55
[53950] Scrapping 15.55 12.62 36.57
Pneumatic hammer [80510] Compacting 78.38
Plate Compactor [91300] Compacting 14.24 16.29 41.28
Table 6. Machine+activity identification mode rate comparison between the baseline and novel
systems. Relative improvement is calculated as 100 · (novelaccuracy−baselineaccuracy)baselineaccuracy .
Big excavator Small excavator PneumaticHammer
Plate
Compactor Averages
Moving Hitting Scrapping Moving Hitting Scrapping Compacting Compacting
Baseline 49.05% 20.11% 26.03% 50.50% 13.78% 30.22% 71.84% 39.51% 45.15%
Novel 66.09% 22.15% 33.74% 57.9% 14.32% 36.57% 78.38% 41.28% 54.92%
Relative improvement 34.74% 10.14% 29.62% 12.89% 3.92% 21.01% 9.10% 4.48% 21.30%
method). This may be again due to the availability of more training data, which results in a more447
robust GMM.448
Our selection proposal is the Product-based combination from medium and long temporal449
window sizes, since this presents the best overall accuracy with consistent improvements for each450
individual class.451
Table 5 shows the corresponding confusion matrix of this combination, where we have removed452
the values below chance (1/8 = 12.5%) to ease the visualization and analysis, and where we have453
used color information as a visual aid. In general, it is clearly seen that the diagonal contains the454
greatest figures for each class (with at least 9% absolute better accuracy compared to the second455
most recognized one, i.e., 33.74%-24.64%=9.10% in the big excavator doing scrapping), except for456
the hitting activity. For the big excavator, this is confused with the moving and scrapping activities.457
On the one hand, the big excavator doing hitting has the less amount of training data, which can458
cause that the classification process prefers the GMM for which more training data are available. On459
the other hand, scrapping also includes hitting when the shovel contacts the ground, which is also460
causing confusion in the small excavator. The classes with the lowest performances correspond to461
the hitting and scrapping activities, which are also confused between each other. On the one hand,462
these are the classes with the less amount of training data, which derives in a less robust GMM. In463
addition, hitting and scrapping activities present different acoustic behaviors (moving up the shovel,464
moving it down, hitting, scrapping, moving, etc.), which may degrade the GMM, since just a single465
GMM component is used for modeling.4466
It is also important to note the significant improvements in the identification rates with respect467
to the baseline system, as shown in Table 6. The relative performance improvement between the468
baseline and novel systems range from 4.48% up to 37.74%, with an average value of 21.30%, which469
clearly validates the strategy used towards improving the overall performance.470
4 Increasing the number of GMM components does not provide any gain, probably due to the small amount of training data
for these classes.
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5.3.2. Threat detection mode471
For the threat detection mode, the overall classification accuracy shows a similar trend. All the472
method combinations for any window size significantly outperform the baseline (p < 10−26 for a473
paired t-test).474
Combining all the temporal window sizes with the Maximum method outperforms the baseline475
both for the threat detection rate (from the 80.7% baseline performance up to 81.1%, which implies476
a relative improvement of 0.5%), and false alarm rate (from the 40.3% baseline performance down477
to 35.4%, which implies a relative improvement of 12%). These improvements are significant for the478
threat detection rate (p < 10−5) and for the false alarm rate (p < 10−28). By integrating all the window479
sizes in a small classification task (two classes: threat/non-threat) the feature space is modeled in such480
a different way that the pattern classification makes different and complementary errors, so that the481
final performance gets improved in the Maximum method, for which the classifier with the highest482
likelihood takes the final decision.483
6. Conclusions and Future Work484
This paper has presented a novel approach for a pipeline integrity threat detection system that485
employs a φ-OTDR fiber optic-based sensing system for data acquisition by adding feature-level486
contextual information and system combination in the pattern recognition stage. The proposal487
achieves consistent and significant improvements that were verified in a machine+activity488
identification task, where the machine and the activity carried out must be known, and in a threat489
detection task, where just the occurrence of a threat for the pipeline has to be known.490
Feature-level contextual information in isolation has been shown to perform well for491
machine+activity pairs that possess a stable behavior and for which enough training data are492
available. Adding the decision combination from different pattern recognition processes that493
run on different contextual information window sizes has been shown to outperform the overall494
classification accuracy and the class classification accuracy for both tasks.495
Although the results presented in this paper have improved those of the baseline in a great extent496
(about 21% relative in the machine+activity identification mode, and 12% relative in the false alarm497
rate with a slight improvement of 0.5% relative in the threat detection rate for the threat detection498
mode), there is still much work to do. For classes for which different behaviors exist and the amount499
of training data is low, the improvements obtained are not as high as for the rest of the classes.500
Therefore, future work should focus on these low-performance classes by, for example, developing501
new strategies that will also extend our system to make use of contextual information in the spatial502
domain (that is by using the acoustic traces from nearby sensed positions, which should experience503
similar disturbances simultaneously).504
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